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   1 
ABSTRACT  
 
 
While much attention has focused on the individuals and events responsible for and 
leading to the passage of the historic Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, considerably less 
attention has focused on the implementation, administration, and enforcement of the law in the 
years directly following its enactment.  It is this topic that will be the focus of this paper, 
specifically the politics surrounding the implementation of the landmark legislation.  It is easy to 
forget that those within the Bureau of Chemistry charged with administrating the historic food 
and drug law were ultimately political actors operating against a political backdrop.  This paper 
will seek to put this political dimension of the law into sharp focus, specifically examining and 
analyzing the bureaucratic politics, personal politics, partisan politics, and electoral politics 
surrounding the Bureau of Chemistry in its attempts to administer, implement, and enforce the 
landmark Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   2 
INTRODUCTION 
  Since its enactment over a century ago, considerable attention has focused on the 
remarkable, monumental campaign that resulted in enactment of the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 
1906.  For those familiar with the events leading up to its passage, this is hardly surprising.  The 
story of the young, brilliant crusader, Harvey Wiley leading the charge for radical reform of the 
nation’s food and drugs laws, aided by muckrakers such as Upton Sinclair and Samuel Hopkins 
Adams, and who ultimately galvanizes the country and wins over a skeptical Congress and 
President to secure support for the law is undoubtedly a gripping one that is likely to examined 
and retold for years to come.   
   Considerably less attention, however, has been paid to the implementation and 
enforcement of the new law in those years immediately following its enactment.  It is this topic 
that will be the focus of this paper, specifically the politics surrounding the implementation of 
the landmark legislation.  It is easy to forget that those within the Bureau of Chemistry charged 
with administrating the historic food and drug law were ultimately political actors operating 
against a political backdrop.  This paper will seek to put this political dimension of the law into 
sharp focus, specifically examining and analyzing the bureaucratic politics, personal politics, 
partisan politics, and electoral politics surrounding the Bureau of Chemistry in its attempts to 
administer, implement, and enforce the landmark Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906.  
It is worth nothing what this paper does not seek to do: it does not seek to re-tell the story 
of those characters and events responsible for securing passage of the 1906 against all odds.  
That story has been and need not be repeated here.  Instead, this paper focuses on the aftermath, 
specifically the six years between the law’s enactment to Wiley’s resignation as Chief Chemist, 
and aims to investigate how the various kinds of politics afflicting the Bureau of Chemistry   3 
ultimately affected the administration of the new law and those within the Bureau charged with 
doing so.     
Part I of this paper will offer brief backgrounds on two of the central characters of our 
story: Secretary of Agriculture, James Wilson and Bureau of Chemistry Chief, Harvey Wiley.  
This section will endeavor to offer not just mere biographical information on these figures but to 
also provide insight on how their respective backgrounds shaped their respective beliefs and 
motivated their decisions, explaining their seemingly “political” behavior.  
Part II will detail how the personal and professional struggle between these men, both 
before and after passage of the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act, reflected a larger struggle both 
within and beyond the Bureau of Chemistry over how the new law should be administered and 
enforced.  This section will detail how personal and professional politics between the two men 
led to an erosion of ties between them while also igniting a constant and seemingly endless array 
of bureaucratic infighting within the Chemistry Division and the Department of Agriculture more 
generally.  
By examining a series of “labeling” crises, Part III will put into sharper focus the various 
types of politics at work within the Bureau of Chemistry at this time, and will illustrate how they 
led to constant strife and bickering among Wiley and his colleagues within the Bureau of 
Chemistry while also affecting implementation of the law.  As this section will illustrate, the 
various labeling controversies would render Wiley’s tenure as Chief Chemist increasing 
untenable, ultimately leading to his resignation in 1912.  
Part IV, the final section of this paper, will investigate the remarkable political 
ramifications that Wiley’s resignation would have for the Republican Party during the 
presidential election of 1912.  In brief, this part of the paper will demonstrate how Wiley, a   4 
staunch and lifelong Republican who once wrote that a, “Democrat sustains the same relation to 
the political world, that a damned sinner does to the moral,”
1 felt betrayed by his erstwhile 
Republican employers, campaigned on behalf of Democrats, and ultimately played a decisive 
role in turning the pure food issue against the GOP, helping Democrats win the White House in 
1912. 
Some concluding thoughts will follow.   
PART I: BRIEF BACKGROUNDS ON JAMES WILSON & HARVEY WILEY 
James Wilson 
  Born in Scotland just like the Founding Father with whom he shares a name, James 
Wilson moved to the United States at the age of sixteen with his family in 1851.  Originally 
arriving in Connecticut, the Wilson family felt that the tiny New England state held little promise 
and few prospects for them, and they ultimately moved to Iowa, settling a farm in northern Tama 
County near the town of Traer.
2   
  In 1861 shortly before the eruption of the Civil War, Wilson bought his own farm at the 
tender age of twenty-six, and two years later, married Esther Wilburn.  Adeptly anticipating 
Iowa’s future as an agricultural center of the country, Wilson grew corn to feed pigs and cattle on 
his farm at a time when most farmers during this period were raising wheat as a cash crop.
3   
  Wilson’s long political career began with a three-year stint as a member of the Tama 
County Board of Supervisors.  Elected to the Iowa House of Representatives in 1867, he served 
as speaker for two years before becoming a professor of agriculture at present-day Iowa State 
University.  In 1872, Wilson was elected to the United States House of Representatives, 
                                                 
1 Hanover Notebook, 158, Harvey W. Wiley Papers, available at 
http://www4.lib.purdue.edu/archon/index.php?p=collections/controlcard&id=609 
2 See generally MARGARET LEECH, IN THE DAYS OF MCKINLEY (Harper and Brothers) 1959 
3 Id.   5 
representing Iowa’s Fifth Congressional District where his legislative record on agricultural 
issues was an extensive one.  In Congress, Wilson became known as a “Granger Congressman”
4 
for his strong support for government assistance to farmers, and was responsible for introducing 
in Congress the very first bill dedicated to elevating the Department of Agriculture to cabinet-
level status.  In 1883, Wilson served on the conference committee that established the Bureau of 
Animal Industry.   
The Bureau, tasked with inspecting meat for export with the purpose of controlling the 
spread of animal diseases, represented a new type of agency that effectively sought to combine 
scientific research with potent regulatory powers.  Wilson’s work on the bill reflected his deeply 
held belief that government should not just support the country’s agricultural interests, but 
should do so in a very specific and particular way.
5  His time as professor and later dean of Iowa 
State (formerly Iowa Agricultural College), strengthened his conviction that government should 
develop and promote agricultural science—science calibrated specifically towards solving 
agricultural problems.
6   
Although he lacked any formal scientific training or any interest in pure scientific 
research, Wilson espoused a version of science that contained an “agricultural squint” which 
could serve “the man in the field.”
7 After losing a hotly contested congressional election in 1882 
yet still serving out the term after being seated following the election, Wilson returned to Iowa 
and rejoined the faculty at Iowa State, where, in addition to his professorial and deanship duties, 
he served as director of the agricultural Experiment Station from 1890 to 1897. 
                                                 
4 A. HUNTER DUPREE, SCIENCE IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 163-67 (Harvard University Press) 
(1957) 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 VERNON WILCOX, TAMA JIM 73 (The Stratford Company) (1930)   6 
Although a figure of considerable local import, Wilson suddenly rose to national 
prominence after President William McKinley appointed him Secretary of Agriculture in 1897.  
Reporting on the appointment, the New York Sun quipped that the Wilson was “known [only] to 
Iowa and the vegetable kingdom.”
8  Other newspapers confused him with James F. Wilson, a 
former United States Senator from the same state.  Despite his relative national obscurity, Wilson 
was well known to McKinley as they had served together in the U.S. House of Representatives, 
and his appointment as Secretary of Agriculture fulfilled the president’s obligation to Iowa 
Republicans for their 1896 election support.   
  Eminently qualified for the job, Wilson’s tenure as Agriculture Secretary stood in stark 
contrast to that of his predecessor, J. Sterling Morton.
9  During his time as Secretary, Morton 
reduced the size of the Department of Agriculture, regularly returning funds to the United States 
Treasury.  Known for ruling with a heavy hand as well as for his frugality, Morton closely 
monitored the smallest expenditures, routinely reprimanding department employees for 
perceived excessive spending.  Although Morton supported scientific research, he did so only in 
those areas he believed would serve all farmers as opposed to special interest groups.   
  Wilson’s approach as Secretary was markedly different.  Upon assuming office, Wilson 
toured the entire Department and acquainted himself with its employees and their activities.  He 
was known to wander around the department halls, meeting and talking with staff and 
colleagues, eager to hear and act on new ideas he believed carried potential.
10  With close ties to 
Congress from his previous time serving there, Wilson was familiar with Washington, and 
                                                 
8 New York Sun, Sept. 8, 1897, cited by WILLIAM LEE HOING, JAMES WILSON AS SECRETARY OF 
AGRICULTURE (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation at the University of Wisconsin) (1964) available 
at http://www.worldcat.org/title/james-wilson-as-secretary-of-agriculture-1897-
1913/oclc/2220628 
9 Interestingly, Secretary Morton was responsible for conceptualizing “Arbor Day”   
10 Hoing, supra note 8    7 
particularly the appropriations process, rendering him an effective and powerful advocate of the 
Agriculture Department.  He routinely secured funds to expand the work and research of his 
various bureau chiefs, even when their work did not directly focus on agricultural issues yet 
could potentially benefit American farmers.
11  For example, while the Bureau of Animal 
Industry, the Bureau of Entomology and Soils, and the Weather Bureau all expanded under 
Wilson’s watch, so too did the Forest Service, Bureau of Plant Industry, and the Bureau of 
Chemistry.  These departments expanded into innovative, new areas, experienced significant 
organizational changes, and witnessed dramatically increased budgets.  The chiefs of these 
bureaus, Beverly Galloway, Gifford Pinchot, and Harvey Wiley, respectively, were all men of 
considerable import, who flourished in various capacities under Wilson. 
  Pinchot, for example, garnered prominence and praise for his efforts towards successfully 
bringing the National Forest Service from the Interior Department to the Department of 
Agriculture’s jurisdiction.  His exhaustive national forest management and preservation plans 
earned him widespread support from a broad range of interest groups including the American 
National Livestock Association, mining companies, logging companies, and other similar 
organizations.
12  His work kept him in the public eye and made him of a darling of the Roosevelt 
Administration, affording him unparalleled access to the highest echelons of political power.  He 
attributed his success to Wilson, recounting in his autobiography, “[Secretary Wilson] was a 
grand man to work for…He knew enough…to give a man his head-let him alone, so long as he 
stayed on the right track.”
13   Without Wilson’s support, Pinchot writes, “We could have never 
done our work and won our fight as we did.”  His words are all the more remarkable given that 
                                                 
11 Id.  
12 JAMES PENICK, JR., PROGRESSIVE POLITICS AND CONSERVATION: THE BALLINGER-PINCHOT 
AFFAIR (University of Chicago Press) (1968) 
13 GIFFORD PINCHOT, BREAKING NEW GROUND 137 (Harcourt, Brace, & Co.) (1947)   8 
he wrote them years after the Ballinger Affair that led to his split with Wilson and dismissal from 
the Taft Administration in 1912. 
  Galloway, chief of the Forest Service, similarly achieved industry-wide prominence for 
reorganizing those divisions beneath him to create the Plant Industry, but more importantly, for 
also innovating new farmer-oriented services.  By architecting new services to provide to 
America’s farmers and then marshalling the necessary resources to furnish them, Galloway 
earned significant acclaim.
14  Like Pinchot, he too acknowledged Wilson’s role in enabling his 
success, averring that he could not have achieved what he had without the Secretary’s crucial 
support.
15   
  Harvey Wiley, hero to the modern consumer protection movement, champion of the Pure 
Food and Drugs Act, and first commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, would prove 
to be the exception among his bureau chief counterparts.  His conflict with Wilson and a host of 
others in the Department would ultimately ruin the Iowan’ reputation and, more importantly, 
have far-reaching and profound ramifications for the presidential administrations for which the 
two men worked.  Before turning our attention to this issue—one of the major focuses of this 
paper—it is first worth briefly exploring Harvey Wilson’s life, and those factors that ultimately 
led him on a collision course with Secretary Wilson and some of his other Bureau of Chemistry 
colleagues. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Dupree supra note 4  167-69 
15 Id.   9 
  Harvey Wiley  
Born in 1844 in a log farmhouse near Kent Indiana in Jefferson County, Wiley was the 
son of a farmer who found his childhood days monopolized by farm chores.
16  He enrolled in 
Hanover College in 1863 but submitted to his patriotic compulsions to drop out of school and 
enlist with the Union Army shortly afterwards.  One year later in 1864, Wiley found himself as a 
corporal in Company I of the 137
th Regiment Indiana Volunteers at the start of the Civil War.  
His desire to serve his country, however, was cut short as he fell victim to hook worm, and 
Wiley returned to Hanover in 1865, majoring in humanities, graduating with a bachelors two 
years later, and then with a masters degree three years after that.  While completing his 
humanities education, Wiley served as a professor or Greek and Latin at Butler College 
(formerly Northwestern Christian University) between 1868 and 1870. 
   Wiley enrolled at Indiana Medical College shortly thereafter, earning his medical degree 
in 1871 and accepted a teaching position there after graduation.  Wiley taught the state’s first 
laboratory course in chemistry at Indiana Medical College before receiving another bachelor’s 
degree from Harvard in 1873.  By 1874 Wiley accepted a tenured faculty position at the newly 
minted Purdue University while at the same time being appointed state chemist of Indiana.   
He next traveled to Germany to deepen his chemistry research, and was eventually 
elected to the prestigious German Chemical Society.  His work in Germany focused on food 
adulteration, and when he returned to Purdue he published a paper—the first of many—on food 
adulteration, a topic that would become one of the primary focuses of his life’s work.  The paper 
examined sugar adulteration with regards to the use of glucose, igniting controversy among the 
nation’s beekeepers who feared that Wiley’s findings would encourage the use of artificial honey 
                                                 
16 See generally, HARVEY W. WILEY, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (Kessinger Publishing) (Originally 
published 1930) (2005)   10 
and adversely impact the market of natural honey.
17  Demonstrating the strategic and political 
brilliance that would later catapult him to national prominence (but perhaps also be responsible 
for his downfall), Wiley filed a report with the Indiana State Board of Health illustrating 
glucose’s harmful impact on honey.  He also enumerated the means of preventing the 
adulteration, effectively turning his critics into admirers, prompting him to later observe, “the 
beekeepers of the country became my most enthusiastic supporters.”
18 
In 1882 Indiana Governor Albert Porter appointed Wiley as the state’s delegate to the 
National Convention of Sorghum Growers in St. Louis, Missouri.  At the convention, Wiley met 
George Loring, United States Commissioner of Agriculture.  Seeking to replace his Chief 
Chemist, Peter Collier, with an individual who adopted a more objective and scientific approach 
to the study of sorghum, he felt he had found his man in Wiley.  After two initial meetings with 
Wiley that left him highly impressed, Loring offered him the job of Chief Chemist at the 
Department of Agriculture.  The timing was indeed fortuitous.  Wiley had been under 
consideration to become Purdue’s new president, yet was passed over for the job, allegedly 
because be was “too young and too jovial,” held eccentric religious beliefs, and was unmarried.
19  
He also provoked the ire of school administrators for riding a bicycle to campus, which was 
apparently below the dignity expected of professors.
20 
There is no doubt that Wiley was supremely qualified for the job.  Armed with a wealth 
of practical agricultural knowledge, a sympathetic posture towards the agricultural industry, 
                                                 
17 See generally Jonathon W. White Jr., Wiley Led the Way: A Century of Federal Honey 
Research, JOURNAL OF THE ASSOCIATION OF ANALYTICAL CHEMISTS, Vol. 70 No. 2 (1987) 
18 Wiley, supra note 16 at 183-184 
19 Past Commissioners, Harvey W. Wiley, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CommissionersPage/PastCommissioners/ucm113692.htm  
20 OSCAR E. ANDERSON JR., THE HEALTH OF A NATION: HARVEY W. WILEY AND THE FIGHT FOR 
PURE FOOD 25 (University of Chicago Press) (1958)   11 
longstanding experience as state chemist, and a soon-to-be demonstrated talent for public 
relations, Wiley seemed ideally suited for the post.  At the same time, however, it must be 
emphasized that Wiley’s Republican affiliation was a crucial factor behind his appointment to 
the Department of Agriculture.  Republican Chester A. Arthur controlled the White House and 
thus all federal appointments and thus it is unlikely that Wiley would have secured the post had 
he been a Democrat.
21  As Wiley and his adversaries would discover over the years, partisan 
politics certainly mattered and inevitably affected the course of the Chief Chemist’s work.   
As Chief Chemist of the Department of Agriculture, Wiley moved quickly to expand 
upon his food adulteration work at the federal level.  Marshalling the new resources now at his 
disposal, he ordered the establishment of sugar factories and other government laboratories 
around the country so that he could further his investigations and research on the issue. 
Wiley’s rapidly rising career, however, would be threatened by political realities 
seemingly unrelated to his work:  the election of the corpulent Democrat, Grover Cleveland, to 
the White House in 1884 nearly brought an abrupt end to Wiley’s tenure as Chief Chemist.  
Illustrating that not all Democrats were perfidious creatures, however, Wiley’s Democratic 
friends vouched for Wiley with the new administration, emphasizing his talents and abilities over 
his political and ideological affiliations.
22   
The Cleveland Administration retained Wiley as Chief Chemist for the duration of both 
its terms, and he passionately and aggressively continued his food adulteration work, while also 
launching investigations into misbranding and labeling, issues that would become a volatile and 
controversial ones during the Roosevelt and Taft Administrations.  His efforts in these realms as 
                                                 
21 Anthony Gaughan, Harvey Wiley, Theodore Roosevelt, and the Federal Regulation of Food 
and Drugs, Harvard Law School, Winter 2004, p. 5 
22 Id.    12 
well as towards promoting the agricultural industry significantly raised Wiley’s national profile 
and stature.  In 1892, for example, he was elected to the presidency of the American Chemical 
Society.  He went on speaking tours around the United States to raise public awareness of issues 
of import to him including food adulteration and misbranding.  Doing so made him a household 
name throughout the country, and definitively established his credentials as an effective 
consumer protection advocate, scientist, researcher, and reformer.  
 By the time William McKinley was elected to the presidency in 1896, Wiley had 
achieved considerable fame and name and he was one of the most well known public figures in 
the United States.  Yet, fame would prove to be both a blessing and a burden for Wiley, and 
McKinley’s ascension to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue would not only put into sharp focus the 
political dimensions of Wiley’s work but would also put him on a collision course with his new 
departmental colleagues and superiors—most notably Wilson—that would forever change the 
professional lives of the men involved. 
PART II: CONFLICT ARISES BETWEEN WILSON AND WILEY  
  Shortly after William McKinley’s election to the White House in 1896, Wiley wrote to a 
colleague that, “It is so good to have a republican [sic] administration once more.  I hope that it 
will last for twenty years at least.”
23  Wiley’s exultation was motivated by his belief that while 
his tenure as Chief Chemist under the Democratic Administrations had been successful, its 
efficacy had been greatly limited as a result of partisan politics within the Department of 
Agriculture.  In Willey’s view, Secretary Morton had downgraded and undermined the 
Chemistry Bureau because its chief was a Republican.  He believed that Morton had done so by 
                                                 
23 Wiley to S.S. Grisby, Mar. 6, 1897, Wiley Papers, available at 
http://www4.lib.purdue.edu/archon/index.php?p=collections/findingaid&id=609&q=&rootconte
ntid=469#id469   13 
promoting other bureaus within the department at its expense.  He clashed with the other bureau 
heads who had hired their own chemists and who, Wiley believed, were encroaching on areas 
that he considered the rightful province of his bureau.   
With the return of a Republican administration, Wiley hoped to return to his bureau to the 
center of importance in the scientific endeavors of the department.  He informed the newly 
appointed Secretary Wilson that he, Wiley, was the good Republican among various chiefs of the 
scientific sections of the department.  He claimed that the administration had appointed “10 of 
the 13” bureau heads, and that among them all, he was a “strong protectionist.”
24  Despite 
Wiley’s pleas, Wilson resisted bringing all the chemical work back to the Chemistry Division, 
prompting Wiley to reach out to his friends in the administration to politically pressure Wilson to 
make the desired changes.  Wiley also began openly challenging the work of other scientific 
bureaus, hoping that his statute in conjunction with his questioning of the quality and soundness 
of some of their work would compel Wilson to make the changes the Chief Chemist sought.   
Wiley’s maneuvering unsurprisingly angered Wilson.  Wiley’s campaign to force the 
secretary’s hand had created problems with the other bureau chiefs and made Wilson appear 
impotent and unable to control the bureaucratic infighting within his agency. “If anybody here 
gets too big for his trousers,” Wilson warned,  “we shall have to give him the privilege of going 
where trousers of larger dimensions are furnished."
25  Clearly, Wilson and Wiley’s relationship 
had gotten off on the wrong foot; Wiley’s prominence clearly had its advantages but also its 
disadvantages.   
                                                 
24 Wiley to C.I. Long, Feb. 13, 1897, available at 
http://www4.lib.purdue.edu/archon/index.php?p=collections/findingaid&id=609&q=&rootconte
ntid=469#id469 
25 Hoing, supra note 8 at 101-02    14 
Despite the fact that Wiley and Wilson had not endeared themselves to one another 
Wilson was committed to supporting his agency’s most prominent bureau chief.  Wilson 
encouraged Wiley to continue his nationally celebrated food adulteration work believing that 
adulterated food greatly harmed the reputation of American agricultural products and thus 
undermined exports.   
The expansion of the government’s food adulteration activities, however, required 
passage of new legislation, specifically a pure food and drug law that placed administrative 
authority with his bureau, something that Wiley had sought unsuccessfully for more than a 
decade.
26   Wiley recognized early on that securing such a law would require putting together a 
coalition of powerful and like-minded individuals and interest groups.  He courted and garnered 
the support of groups such as the Heinz Company, sugar refiners, baking powder refiners, and 
straight-whiskey producers.
27  While courting these interests, however, Wiley alienated other 
business groups including corn-syrup producers, rectified whiskey, alum manufacturers, and 
users of preservatives through his well-publicized statements condemning their products.  
Wiley’s statements predictably created strong opposition, albeit not necessarily against the food 
law, but rather to Wiley as administrator of the law.  Wiley responded to his critics by launching 
vitriolic personal attacks against them, impugning their honesty and the quality of their products, 
and routinely characterizing them as cheats, poisoners and their products as adulterated frauds.
28  
  While he supported the pure food and drug law, Wilson found Wiley’s behavior alarming 
and cause for concern.  He believed that Wiley was seeking too much publicity through the press 
and counseled Wiley against these tactics.  Wilson feared that Wiley’s actions would damage the 
                                                 
26 See generally Anderson, supra note 20  
27 See generally James Harvey Young, The Long Struggle for the 1906, FDA CONSUMER 12-16 
(1987) 
28 Anderson, supra note 20   15 
reputation of all American food products worldwide.
29  Wiley more or less complied with 
Wilson’s request, and turned to indirect methods of securing support for his publicity campaign 
in favor of the new food law.  In addition to his collaboration with such prominent public figures 
such as Alice Lakey whose efforts led to more than 1 million women writing the White House in 
support of the Pure Food and Drugs law, others such as straight-whiskey makers, muckraking 
journalists, United States Senators, and even author-activist Upton Sinclair were all ready and 
willing to join Wiley’s campaign.
30  Finally, in 1906, Congress passed the long-awaited and 
sought after legislation.   President Theodore Roosevelt, a late convert to Wiley’s cause, rode to 
Capitol Hill from the White House and signed the bill into law.   
  Approved by overwhelming majorities in both the House and Senate, the new legislation 
prohibited interstate or foreign commerce in any food or drug that was adulterated or misbranded 
within the meaning of certain general definitions.
31  Violations were punishable by fine or 
imprisonment or both, although a dealer was to be immune from prosecution when he could 
produce a guarantee from either a retailer or manufacturer that items of concern did not violate 
the law.  Adulterated or misbranded products could be proceeded against in federal district courts 
and seized by libel for condemnation.  Though uniform regulations for carrying out these 
provisions were to be formulated by the Secretaries of the Treasury, Commerce, Labor, and 
Agriculture, responsibility of the administration rested in Wilson’s department exclusively.  
Food and drugs were to be examined solely by the Bureau of Chemistry.  If adulteration or 
misbranding had been found to have taken place, the Secretary of Agriculture was to give notice 
to the party from whom the sample was obtained.  Anyone so notified was to be given a hearing, 
                                                 
29 Id. at 149-52 
30 Again, for a general account of passage of the law, see Andersen supra note 20 and Young, 
supra note 27 
31 Id.   16 
and if it appeared that the law had been violated, the Secretary was at once to certify the facts to 
the proper district attorney.  
Passage of the Pure Food and Drugs Act was undoubtedly Wiley’s greatest professional 
(and probably personal) achievement.  His efforts would lead the country to bestow upon him the 
mantle of “Father of the Pure Food and Drugs Law.”  That enforcement of the newly minted law 
was given to the Bureau of Chemistry as opposed to the either the Department of Commerce or 
Department of the Interior is a testament to the scientific qualifications which Wiley and the 
Bureau of Chemistry brought to the study of food and drug adulteration and misbranding. 
Despite Wiley’s tremendous triumph, controversy quickly erupted over the 
administration and implementation of the law.  Many interests groups including fruit growers, 
canners, and milk producers, who had opposed the new law raised questions over Wiley’s ability 
to fairly implement the law, citing the hard-knuckled tactics and personal attacks he had engaged 
in to secure passage of the Pure Food and Drugs Act.
32  Other business groups who had 
supported Wiley during his arduous battle over the law, on the other hand, now expected 
substantial benefits from Wiley’s rulings.  The firestorm served to undermine both Secretary 
Wilson’s and President Roosevelt’s confidence in the Chief Chemist.
33 
In response, Secretary Wilson—with President Roosevelt’s explicit approval—created 
the Board of Food and Drug Inspection, which comprised of Wiley, George P. McCabe—the 
Agriculture Department’s aggressive and hyper-competent Solicitor— and finally Frederick L. 
Dunlap, Professor of Chemistry at the University of Michigan, who was brought in specifically 
for the post and given the title “Associate Chemist.”  The board was to consider all questions 
                                                 
32 See generally CLAYTON ANDERSON COPPIN, THE POLITICS OF PURITY: HARVEY WASHINGTON 
WILEY AND THE ORIGINS OF FEDERAL FOOD POLICY (University of Michigan Press) (1999) 
33 Id, quoting letter from Hough to Wilson, dated Dec. 1906   17 
upon which the decision of the Secretary was necessary, to report its findings to him, and to 
conduct all hearings of the alleged violations.  
There is little doubt that the establishment of the Board of Food and Drug Inspection was 
a deliberate move on Wilson’s part to restrain Wiley, who in turn interpreted the decision to 
create the board as a direct attack on himself and the integrity of his much beloved food and drug 
law.  Wilson’s decision was likely motivated by his desire to reduce his dependence on the 
increasingly troublesome Wiley who had ignited considerable bureaucratic infighting within the 
Department.
34  Although Wiley was made chairman of the board, each member reported directly 
to Secretary Wilson thus allowing them to essentially circumvent Wiley.  Immediately following 
the creation of the board, Wiley relentlessly attacked the honesty and integrity of its two newest 
members—and by extension Wilson— in an attempt to discredit them and to retain sole control 
over the implementation and administration of the new law.   
The creation of the Board of Food and Drug Inspection in 1907 marked the beginning of 
a long battle between Wiley and his department superiors and colleagues that would center 
around a series of labeling crises and would ultimately result in his forced retirement from 
government service five years later in 1912.  Those labeling crises, the politics surrounding 
them, and the acute strain they created between Wiley, Wilson, and other members of the Bureau 
of Chemistry will be the focus of the next section of this paper. 
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PART III: A SERIES OF LABELING CRISES  
  The first labeling crisis focused on whiskey, specifically on the question of what 
constituted whisky.
35  The difficulty derived from a particular section of the Pure Food and 
Drugs Act that dictated that the term “blend” should mean a mixture of like substances.   In the 
context of whisky, Secretary Wilson signed Food Inspection Decision 45 in December 1906, just 
months before the creation of the Board of Food Inspection, ruling that mixtures of bourbon 
whisky and neutral spirits were not to labeled “blended whisky.”  Underlying Wilson’s decision 
was Wiley’s belief that neutral spirits, either colored or flavored, were not whisky but a cheap 
imitation instead.  When mixed with “real” whisky, it was still not a blend but rather a mixture of 
like substances.  Whisky, Wiley maintained, could only be produced by distilling the fermented 
ingredients so that the distillate contained not only ethyl alcohol but also all the products that 
were volatile at the required temperatures of distillation.
36  Neutral spirits, on the other hand, 
Wiley believed, produced in still, which permitted fractionating of the distillate, was ethyl 
alcohol but with hints of other substances that gave whisky its unique character.  In other words, 
the distinction rested upon honesty, not necessarily wholesomeness. 
Wilson’s ruling in Food Inspection Decision 45 predictably raised cries of opposition 
from rectifying firms who protested directly to President Roosevelt and Secretary Wilson that 
neutral sprits were no more than rectified, purified, and refined whisky.  Even when colored and 
flavored they still constituted whisky and had always been known as such.  Worried by the 
magnitude of their protest, Roosevelt attempted to study the issue himself and then implored his 
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Attorney General, Charles J. Bonaparte, to do the same and make recommendations.  Bonaparte, 
like Wiley, concluded that neutral spirits were not a like substance, prompting Roosevelt to 
direct Wilson’s department that only a mixture of two or more straight whiskies should be called 
a “blend.”  Straight whisky mixed with ethyl alcohol should be labeled a “compound” if there 
were enough straight whisky to make it genuinely a mixture.  Neutral spirits with color and 
flavor, on the other hand, should be labeled an “imitation.”
37  Although subsequent events would 
later demonstrate that the whisky dispute was far from resolved
38, Wiley’s views had prevailed.  
While Wilson ostensibly supported the decision, Wiley would later come to believe that his 
ability to persuade President Roosevelt on this issue was a key factor leading Wilson to create 
the Board of Food Inspection to limit the scope of Wiley’s influence with the president.
39  The 
belief would shape Wiley’s behavior and reactions to similar controversies in the future. 
The next labeling fight that would lead to relations between Wiley, the Board, and 
Wilson to further erode, focused on a product with which Wiley was intimately familiar: glucose.  
A sweet, highly viscous combination of cornstarch treated with hydrochloric acid, glucose was 
not sold directly to the public, but rather to candy and other manufacturers who embraced as an 
extremely cheap and cost-effective adulterant.  In 1902, however, the Corn Products Refining 
Company began selling the product directly within the retail trade, labeling it as “Karo Corn 
Sirup,” [sic] a name clearly adopted to overcome the public stigma attached to glucose.  Shortly 
after the Pure Food and Drugs Law was enacted, Corn Products Refining Company sought and 
successfully obtained a hearing on the matter.  “Glucose” it argued, was simply a trade name for 
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a wholesome product against which the public was unduly and unfairly prejudiced, while “corn 
sirup” satisfied the spirit of the food law because it clearly conveyed to the customer what it 
was—a syrup—and where it was derived from—corn.
40  Wiley, unsurprisingly, disagreed.  
Labeling the product “corn sirup” he argued, was a fraudulent term and fraudulent practice 
aimed at deceiving consumers to buy something they otherwise would not.
41   
At first, the Board of Food and Drug Inspection agreed with Wiley and concluded that 
“corn sirup” was not a satisfactory label for glucose.  Secretary Wilson issued the corresponding 
ruling, yet was once again met with strong resistance and renewed protests from Corn Products.  
In response, Wilson promised to the hold the matter in abeyance until additional information and 
new evidence could be received and reviewed.  Corn Products Refining Company—whose board 
and management were both stacked with managers from the all-power and iconic Standard Oil—
brought heavy political pressure to convince Wilson and the Board of the rightness of its views.  
At a new hearing, the case for “corn sirup” was argued in greater detail, with particular emphasis 
on the extent of the various interests that would be harmed if the term could not be used.  
Illustrating a rift that would become characteristic of the Board in the coming years, Wiley 
predictably stood by his position, appalled that a rehearing had even been allowed, while 
McCabe and Dunlap reversed themselves and found the label “corn sirup” permissible.
42   
The debate finally found resolution in February 1908 when Secretary Wilson, along with 
Treasury Secretary Cortelyou and Commerce and Labor Secretary Strauss, jointly signed a 
decision sanctioning the term preferred by the industry.  From Wiley’s perspective, Wilson and 
the Board had wrongly capitulated to Corn Products at the expense of consumer safety.  The 
                                                 
40 Id. at 138-55 
41 Id. 
42 Id.   21 
entire episode seemed to only validate his belief that the Board had only been created to keep 
him in check and limit his influence within the Department.   
Wiley next sparred with Wilson and the Board over the section of the Pure Food and 
Drugs Act that banned as adulterated food any product that contained any added poisonous or 
other harmful ingredients that might render it injurious to health.
43  Sulfur dioxide, which was 
used widely in the production of wine, molasses, syrup, sugar, and the cultivation of fruit, was 
the first to create a storm of controversy.  Food Inspection Decision 76 issued in June 1907 
guaranteed that pending investigation, no prosecutions would be initiated against any 
manufacturer or farmer if the total amount of sulfur dioxide in food products could be proven to 
be less 350 milligrams per kilogram, and more importantly, if labels revealed its presence.  In a 
pattern quite familiar by now, protests came from agricultural centers around the country who 
opposed the ruling even before it had been issued.  In California, for example, fumes of sulfur 
were used by the fruit-drying industry as both a bleach and as a preservative, and these interests 
there made their concerns well-known to President Roosevelt.  When Roosevelt queried the 
Board about the issue, he received a formal reply from Solicitor McCabe that stated that the U.S. 
government had gone as far as was consistent with the upholding of the law.
44 
Roosevelt regarded the report as conclusive but the fruit interests remain unsatisfied.  
They were concerned that the new regulations and requirements would impose undue burdens on 
both the grower and packer by raising serious doubts as to the validity of their contracts.  At the 
height of the controversy, Secretary Wilson found himself on a tour of the West Coast.  Arriving 
in California in August 1907, he promptly afforded the fruit growers a hearing to solicit their 
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views and give them the opportunity to voice their concerns.  Persuaded by the sheer strength of 
their various arguments, he pledged a comprehensive and thorough investigation into the matter.  
While awaiting its outcome, he also promised immunity from prosecution.  Upon returning to 
Washington, Wilson made the decision not to prosecute, and President Roosevelt agreed.  Once 
again, Wilson’s actions left Wiley angry and bewildered, convinced that the Secretary of 
Agriculture was putting the interests of business over that of the consumer.
45   
Yet it was the use of benzoate in soda as a preservative that proved to be the area of 
greatest conflict between Wiley and Wilson, and would ultimately lead to irreparable differences 
between the two men.  Wiley had long held benzoate—a major ingredient in ketchup— to be 
harmful to human health because its conversion into hippuric acid by the metabolic processes 
placed an additional burden on the excretive organs when the body tried to eliminate it.  Before 
passage of the Pure Food and Drugs Act in 1906, Wiley had informed its users that the new law 
would simply require them to list benzoate of soda on the label, as opposed to banning it 
outright.  Yet, shortly thereafter, he testified to Congress that the product should not be used at 
all, naturally and understandably causing considerable consternation among users of the 
preservative.  The first ruling on the matter, Food Inspection Decision 76, promised immunity 
from prosecution against goods packed with benzoate, provided that its use did not exceed one 
tenth of one percent and that its presence was listed on the label.  After 1907, however, it use 
would be unlawful.  Secretary Wilson generally agreed with the position, yet consented to a 
special hearing on the matter at the preservative users’ request.
46      
  Wiley secretly contacted Sebastian Mueller of the Heinz Company and informed him of 
the hearing, suggesting that Heinz and other non-users be present to speak out against its use, but 
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cautioned Mueller that no one should know that Wiley had directed them to be there.
47  Wiley 
had maintained previous surreptitious contact with the Heinz Company, but the controversy 
surrounding the benzoate of soda forged an alliance between them.  The Heinz Company 
employed press agents to report favorably on Wiley and his activities while at the same time 
attacking his opponents. Wiley would also later use his relationship with Heinz as a means to 
bypass Secretary Wilson and to influence President Roosevelt and later President Taft. 
  At the hearing, the proponents of benzoate argued in favor of its safety, averring that no 
one had ever been hurt by eating the preservative and that experts disagreed about its 
wholesomeness.  Spoilage, they maintained, was a far more acute danger to American health 
than the chemicals used to prevent it.  They further argued that a complete ban on the 
preservative would effectively result in the entire trade being monopolized by two or three major 
companies who were not dependent on benzoate in any capacity.
48 
  Fearing that Wilson and the Board would fall victim to Wiley’s staunch opposition to the 
use of benzoate, its users took their case directly to President Roosevelt who held a hearing on 
the issue in January 1908 to hear for himself the different perspectives on the matter.  By this 
point it seemed that the president was rapidly losing confidence in his Chief Chemist.  The 
frequent and recurring protests among those Wiley opposed as well as the constant bureaucratic 
infighting at the Department of Agriculture evidenced, at the very least, that something was to be 
said on the other side.  Wiley himself felt that he had lost the Roosevelt’s trust in the midst of yet 
another labeling dispute over saccharin, a common and cheap substitute for sugar in canned 
goods whose use Wiley considered a deception and a cause of kidney disease.  In McCabe and 
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Dunlap’s opinion the weight of evidence supported the notion that it was harmless, and that until 
a more definitive determination could made, its use should be permitted so long as its presence 
was declared on the product label.  Despite these internal divisions, Wiley felt compelled to 
express his opinion of saccharin’s harmfulness directly to President Roosevelt during a White 
House conference.  After doing so, Roosevelt turned to Wiley and angrily responded, “Anybody 
who says saccharin is injurious is an idiot.  Dr. Rixey gives it to me everyday.”
49  
  Roosevelt now confronted the benzoate question and it was abundantly clear that some 
action on the issue of added substances and preservatives—sulfur dioxide, benzoate soda, and 
saccharin—would have to be taken before the start of another growing season.  Failure to act 
would create a myriad of problems otherwise.  With his trust in Wiley steadily eroding, 
Roosevelt followed the suggestion of Congressman James Sherman, and in consultation with 
Secretary Wilson decided to create a panel of prominent and well-respected experts charged with 
determining whether or not food additives and preservatives were indeed harmful to human 
health.  The new panel was more broadly tasked with investigating other controversial issues and 
issuing rulings on them.  On February 24, 1908, a five-man Referee Board of Consulting 
Scientific Experts, headed by world-renowned chemist, President Ira Remsen of Johns Hopkins 
University was created.  Their first assignment was to resolve the controversies surrounding 
sulfur dioxide, benzoate, and saccharin that had heretofore consumed the administration.   
  There is little doubt that one of the major reasons prompting President Roosevelt to 
establish the Referee Board was his loss of confidence in Wiley despite his public statements to 
the contrary.
50  Yet when asked by one aggrieved manufacturer who wanted Wiley removed why 
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the president had not only retained him but also continued to publicly support him, Roosevelt 
allegedly and revealing responded, “You don’t understand, Sir that Dr. Wiley has the grandest 
political machine in the country.”
51  
  Wiley unsurprisingly viewed the establishment of the Remsen Board as a threat to his own 
position, an affront to his work, and the latest proof of Wilson’s efforts to undermine him.
52  To 
maintain his authority he had to challenge the Referee Board, and since Secretary Wilson 
supported the Board, that meant challenging Secretary Wilson.   
  The Chief Chemist enlisted the help of some of his most ardent supporters, including the 
Heinz Company and certain members of the National Association of Food and Dairy 
Departments, who proved more than willing to cooperate in attacking the Remsen Board and 
Secretary Wilson.  The Association of State and National Food and Dairy Departments’ national 
convention at Mackinac Island in August 1908 proved to be the ideal opportunity.  In his 
opening remarks, president of the association, E.F. Ladoff, relentlessly attacked Secretary 
Wilson for allegedly failing to support state and federal collaboration activities aimed at 
strengthening food activities and for refusing to support the committee to establish uniform 
safety standards.
53  He went on to vociferously criticize Wilson, alleging that the secretary had 
surrendered to special interests by consenting to the creation of the Remsen Board.  Even more 
damning, the convention went on to pass a resolution formally condemning Secretary Wilson.
54  
Central to the passage of the resolution were Wiley and a host of Wiley’s close friends and 
longtime supporters including E.H. Jenkins of Connecticut, M.A. Scovell of Kentucky, and 
William Frear of Pennsylvania.  Wiley had employed these men in the past to articulate his 
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position or send messages to political enemies all the while staying behind the scenes to maintain 
plausible deniability.  While other association members at the convention objected to the 
resolution on the grounds that it was improper to publicly condemn a cabinet official without 
affording him the opportunity to defend himself, this did not deter Wiley’s supporters and 
Wilson’s detractors from securing its passage.
55 
  The resolution garnered wide press coverage and publicity, and Wilson was naturally 
outraged.  Unable to prove that Wiley was behind the sensational attack, Wilson maintained that, 
at the very least, his Chief Chemist should have defended him and the Department of 
Agriculture. Wiley, now fearful that the Secretary would potentially seek his resignation, 
solicited letters from Scovell and Ladd saying that Wiley had indeed defended the Secretary.  
While Wilson did not seek Wiley’s resignation at this juncture, his dislike and animosity towards 
the Indianan reached new heights and the two men’s relationship was on thin ice.
56 
  To make matters worse, the dispute over benzoate continue unabated, rendering the schism 
between Wilson and Wiley even more pronounced.  Since the Referee Board will still in the 
midst of its investigation, Secretary Wilson prohibited the publication of Wiley’s report on the 
issue, which predictably found the preservative deleterious to human health.
57  Whether Wiley 
leaked the report or whether it was released inadvertently remains unclear, but the report was 
printed, creating the false impression that the government had banned the preservative.  When 
Wilson proposed issuing a reassuring food decision that deemed benzoate safe until the Remsen 
Board found otherwise, Wiley refused to sign onto the decision making public the internal 
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division and strife among the Board of Food an Drug Inspection.
58  With the election of 1908 on 
the horizon, rumors swirled that Wiley would be ousted forcibly or asked to resign although the 
White House refused to acknowledge any serious disagreement among the Board or of an 
impending dismissal.
59   
  In January 1909 the Remsen Board released its long-awaited decision on benzoate, 
concluding it was safe for consumption.  Wiley incensed, once again reached out to his 
supporters both in Congress and in the press to condemn both the Referee Board and Secretary 
Wilson.  In Congress, the reaction was swift.  In the House of Representatives, Congressman 
Level of South Carolina spearheaded the unsuccessful legislative charge to amend the 
agricultural appropriation bill in a way that would abolish the Remsen Board, which, he asserted, 
was an unlawful attempt to render the Pure Food and Drugs Act impotent and to undermine 
Wiley by extension.
60  Senator Heyburn of Idaho who had sponsored the original pure-food bill, 
advanced constitutional arguments against the Board and in favor of Wiley, asserting that the 
Referee Board had been granted a function which the architects of the law had intended to 
remain the sole province of the judiciary.
61 
  The press—a major player in the passage of the Pure Food and Drugs Act in 1906—was 
even more unforgiving, labeling the Remsen Board as agents of food adulterators and dishonest, 
big-moneyed business.  The Century Syndicate allegedly hired Orville LaDow to lead a press 
campaign aimed at supporting Wiley while attacking Wilson and the Referee Board.  Whether 
Wiley personally authorized such a well-organized and well-financed smear campaign against 
Wilson is unclear, but what is clear is that he was outraged by the Remsen Board’s conclusion.   
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  In Wiley’s view, the Referee Board had failed to recognize the spirit of he law, which had 
been intended to safeguard the consumer first and foremost.  With close questions it was always 
better to err on the side of the caution, which meant erring on the side of the consumer.  More 
troubling, the Referee Board’s findings were not reviewable by any court as Congress had 
intended thus raising the specter that the preservative could lead to its general use in other 
products.  The Remsen Board had answered certain narrowly defined questions, which failed to 
grasp the larger, more troubling ramifications of the decision, chief among them that the 
permissible use of benzoate by manufacturers permitted their competitors to process objectively 
inferior materials and thus employ unsanitary methods.  Representatives of the Heinz Company 
brought the matter directly to President Roosevelt who in turn raised it with Remsen.  Remsen 
dismissed the concerns as unfounded and baseless, a position which satisfied Roosevelt.  On his 
last full day of office, a food inspection decision was issued declaring that no objection would be 
raised to benzoate so long as its presence each package of food was labeled to reveal its presence 
and indicate its amount.
62 
  Many Wiley supporters including the Heinz Company regarded William Howard Taft’s 
election to the presidency in 1909 as an opportunity to finally replace Wilson as Secretary of 
Agriculture and correct the wrongs the Roosevelt Administration had perpetrated against the 
Pure Food and Drugs Law.  L.S. Dow, a Heinz Company representative, wrote Wiley, informing 
him “An inquiry of a personal nature has come to me from an important, influential source, 
asking for reasons why Secretary Wilson of the United States Department of Agriculture should 
not be reappointed to his present Cabinet position by Mr. Taft.”
63  Wiley provided Dow with 
information he believed would be helpful in preventing Taft from retaining his job.  Despite 
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these efforts, however, Wilson remained tremendously popular with farmers—a key Taft 
constituency—and the portly president reappointed Wilson his Secretary of Agriculture. 
  The arrival of a new administration unfortunately did not herald the end of the benzoate 
controversy.  Proponents and opponents of the Referee Board’s conclusions continued to wage 
war against one another in the press and through indirect channels.  The differences between the 
two sides were dramatized at the meeting of the Association of State and National Food and 
Dairy Departments taking place in Denver in August 1909.  Wilson, fully alert to Wiley’s tactics 
and still bitterly resentful of the attack perpetrated against him at Mackinac, was now intent on 
protecting himself and the Remsen Board.  He stacked the convention full of supporters and 
made sure members of the Remsen Board were present in person so that they could defend their 
findings.
64  Wilson wrote to Taft shortly before the convention to inform the president that Wiley 
had concocted a plan to discredit the Remsen Board but that he was determined that it not 
succeed.
65  While Wiley and his supporters also planned carefully for the convention, in the end 
Wilson prevailed.  After a thorough debate, Wilson narrowly secured the convention’s 
endorsement of the Remsen Board’s report on benzoate.  In an even closer contest, the 
association also elected as its president a candidate supported by Secretary Wilson over the one 
backed by Wiley.  Writing again to President Taft after the meeting, Wilson exulted, “We 
smashed the whole program, turned things end for end, endorsed the Referee Board and its 
findings….”  He went on to call Wiley “a low-breed fellow,” and a “consummate hypocrite.”
66  
  In the same letter Secretary Wilson implored the president to “Consider whether you think 
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it is wise to permit me to call for [Wiley’s] resignation.”
67  Taft, pre-occupied by other 
bureaucratic infighting within the Department of Interior, essentially punted on the question, 
writing back to Wilson that he “should have to knock some heads together when I get back to 
Washington after my trip.  There is too much of a disposition to charge people with bad faith, 
and too great encouragement to newspaper controversy.”
68  Certainly not the response Wilson 
was hoping to receive from the president, it was clear that conflict with Wiley would continue.      
  While the benzoate controversy continued to dominate the public spotlight, behind the 
scenes fighting at the Board of Food and Drug Inspection persisted.  Some exceptions 
notwithstanding, most disputes found McCabe and Dunlap joining together against Wiley.
69  The 
question that most frequently arose to divide the three-member panel was which cases should be 
prosecuted?  The sometimes byzantine rules and regulations of the Pure Food and Drugs Act 
made this question a salient one.  For example, the three-months rule allowed pending cases to 
be placed in abeyance when more than ninety days elapsed without valid explanation between 
taking a sample and reporting in its analysis.  Wiley adamantly opposed the rule, believing that it 
frequently resulted in excusing violations that should have been rightfully prosecuted.  He 
regarded McCabe, Dunlap, and by extension Wilson, as too lenient in exonerating violators who 
pleaded honest mistake.
70  He felt that excusing violations until a test case was decided 
contravened the spirit of the law by granting more protections to manufacturers than 
consumers.
71   
  Larger more substantive disagreements focused on alleged misbranding but were still quite 
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basic.  For example, if a product labeled “Arrow Root Biscuit” contained only fifteen percent 
arrowroot starch, Wiley believed it was misbranded.  Except for salt and shortening, the biscuit 
should be composed entirely of arrowroot for the label to be deemed accurate.  When the Board 
of Food and Drug Inspection adopted a decision that allowed ordinary flour to be sold as gluten 
flour, Wiley was incensed for he believed that not only was the label deceptive but it also 
endangered the health of diabetics.
72  Such disputes were typical of the ones consuming the 
Board.     
  The disagreements amongst the various Board members were explainable by fundamental 
differences in approach and the manner in which they viewed the Pure Food and Drugs Act.  
While Dunlap and McCabe believed that the law should been enforced, they failed to possess 
Wiley’s unwavering crusading zeal to do so.  It is unsurprising that they simply did not share the 
same personal attachment and sense of investment that the “Father of the Pure Food and Drug 
Act” did.  Moreover, McCabe and Dunlap’s methodology and approach were shaped by 
McCabe’s professional background as an attorney.  He felt it prudent to only take cases that he 
believed could be won, and was critical of what he perceived as the Bureau of Chemistry’s legal 
ignorance and ineptitude.  Wiley, by contrast, was wedded to an extreme, almost radical position 
of enforcement of the law, saw the issue as a moral one above all else, and had little patience for 
the Solicitor’s legalese.  Wiley was convinced that once he could get the violation into court his 
power of persuasion could convince any judge or jury of the rightness of his views.   
  By 1911, relations between Wiley and the Board had completely broken down.  Indeed 
both McCabe and Dunlap developed a certain detachment to their work and came to reflexively 
oppose Wiley, regardless of what position he took.  Perceived as incapable of managing his 
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department and keeping his subordinates under control, Wilson was in a difficult position that 
seemed increasingly untenable.
73 
  In June 1910, Secretary Wilson issued General Order 140, which transferred to Solicitor 
McCabe most of the effective power of the Board of Food and Drug Inspection.  The Bureau of 
Chemistry was to now submit the results of its investigations directly to McCabe instead of the 
Board, and McCabe would then advise Wilson whether or not to issue citations for possible 
violations.  While the Board would continue to oversee hearings, recommendations whether to 
prosecute or not would be made exclusively by McCabe.  Wiley believed that the change not 
only emasculated the law but also further marginalized him within the Bureau of Chemistry.   
  Against this background of heightened tension among Wiley, Wilson, and the Board, 
erupted yet another controversy, this one of a much more scandalous nature.
74  The dispute 
focused on Dr. Henry H. Rusby, a pharmacological expert employed to examine crude drugs for 
$9 per day, the legal maximum permissible at the time.  Having previously testified on behalf of 
the government during an enforcement case, Rusby now demanded $50 a day for each day he 
was to appear in Court.  McCabe denied the request on the grounds that it was too exorbitant, but 
the Bureau of Chemistry was intent that he testify in future cases.  Taking a cue from the salary 
structure of Remsen’s Board of Referees which paid its members an annual salary, Wiley 
suggested doing the same for Rusby.  The Bureau of Chemistry could appoint him 
pharmacologist at a rate of $1,600 a year, a proposal that Secretary Wilson approved.  In March 
1911, while Wiley was out of town, Dunlap, serving as acting chief, acquired the files related to 
Rusby’s appointment.  After consulting with McCabe and Wilson, he drafted a memorandum 
that enumerated a series of alleged irregularities involving the salary arrangement and forwarded 
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it to the secretary.  Clearly motivated by personal animosity against Wiley, Dunlap saw an 
opportunity to potentially oust Wiley and quickly seized upon it. 
  Wilson, relying upon only what Dunlap had told him, forwarded the matter to the 
Agriculture Department’s personnel committee, one of whose three members was Solicitor 
McCabe.  On April 20, the committee questioned Rusby, Wiley, and other Bureau of Chemistry 
officials who had negotiated the annual salary with the pharmacologist.  Upon concluding their 
interrogations, the personnel committee issued a report declaring that the $1,600 contracted had 
been negotiated to cover up a secret agreement intended to pay Rusby $20 per day in deliberate 
violation of the $9 statutory ceiling.   The committee concluded that Rusby should be fired and 
that Wiley afforded the opportunity to resign.
75 
  Suspicious of Wiley and relying solely on McCabe’s legal findings, Wilson took the matter 
to a cabinet meeting, declared that the Chief Chemist had violated the law, and urged that Wiley 
be promptly fired.  Attorney General George Wickersham volunteered to evaluate the case from 
a purely legal perspective, and on May 14 advised President Taft to approve the personnel 
committee’s recommendation claiming that the agreement with Rusby, “certainly merits condign 
punishment….”
76 Taft, unsure as to what to do, sat on the matter for more than two months, and 
on July 7 wrote to Wilson and instructed the secretary that Wiley be made privy to the Attorney 
General’s findings and be given an opportunity to make a statement.  Taft believed that Wiley 
had not been presented adequate opportunity to fully defend himself.
77   
  When Wiley learned of the personnel committee’s recommendations and the Attorney 
General’s endorsement of them, he was convinced more than ever of the department-wide 
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conspiracy against him and saw the entire affair as an opportunity to expose it once and for all.  
“We need no defense,” he told one of his clerks, “I am planning an attack.”
78  A week later, the 
New York Times caught wind of the story and broke the news, publishing several documents 
related to the Rusby appointment.  Within a few short days, the entire nation new that Wiley’s 
tenure was under attack.  As it had done so consistently in the past, the press came to Wiley’s 
defense.
79  Letters, resolutions, and statements of concern flooded Taft’s, Wilson’s, and 
Congressional offices, a great percentage of which consisted of loyal Republicans who 
emphasized the high esteem in which the public held Wiley.  To foreshadow the dilemma that 
would confront the President a few months later, these Republicans warned that Taft’s 
presidential candidacy and the success of the Republican Party in 1912 were at stake should 
Wiley be dismissed.
80   
  The Chief Chemist meanwhile had been preparing a statement of defense for President Taft 
in which he condemned the personnel committee as well as the tactics used against him.  He 
relied on precedent from the Remsen Board and had secured approval for the arrangement from 
Secretary Wilson.  What wrong had he committed?  The statement was forwarded to the White 
House, and Secretary Wilson, realizing what was at stake, was now unwilling to support the 
personnel committee’s recommendations.  He felt instead that a small slap on the wrist would 
suffice.
81  Wilson’s sudden ambivalence led other administration officials to similarly 
equivocate.  Attorney General Wickersham sent a letter to Taft expressing regret for not advising 
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a lighter sentence for Wiley.  It would be a mistake, he maintained, to remove Wiley now.
82   
  Confronting a barrage of both public and private pressure to retain Wiley, Taft realized that 
it was politically impossible to dismiss Wiley, despite his personal feelings towards him.  He 
began making statements in the press supportive of Wiley and ordered both the Attorney General 
and Solicitor McCabe to examine the various precedents Wiley had cited in his statement to the 
president.  Taft also closely monitored the House committee hearings that had commenced under 
Chairman Randolph Moss of Indiana and entailed a sweeping investigation of not just the Rusby 
affair but Bureau of Chemistry more generally.  The hearings exposed all the strife and infighting 
that characterized the Bureau of Chemistry and the Department of Agriculture more broadly.  
Upon the completion of Moss’ hearings, Taft issued a decision that would foreshadow his days 
as a Supreme Court Justice.  While he exonerated Wiley of any wrongdoing citing precedent for 
the salary arrangement that had been negotiated, he expressed deep concern for some of the 
larger issues afflicting the Bureau that had been exposed by Moss Committee.  Taft concluded 
his ruling by warning that more radical action may be required.
83 
  Newspapers across the country celebrated Taft’s decision but pondered what the president 
had meant by “radical action.”  Clearly heads would roll within the Department, but the question 
that remained was whose heads they would be.  The answer came in October when Secretary 
Wilson issued General Order 147, replacing McCabe on the Board of Food and Drug Inspection 
with Roscoe E. Doolittle, a prominent scientist based in New York.  The Taft Administration 
went far to satisfy Wiley despite Taft’s and Wilson’s misgivings about doing so.  Wiley now 
effectively controlled the Board since Doolittle could be counted on to support the Chief 
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Chemist.
84  The Board, which had been thrust to the periphery over the years, would now play 
the principal role in ascertaining when citations for hearings should be issued and when cases for 
alleged violations of the law should be prosecuted.  The solicitor was now relegated to doing 
little more than preparing cases and referring them to the appropriate agencies.  Although Wilson 
thought they had gone too far to satisfy Wiley, it was clear that the political calculation that Taft 
had done came out in favor of the Chief Chemist.
85   
  The relative peace and tranquility that descended on the Bureau of Chemistry after the 
organizational change would be short-lived.  The controversy, over baking soda, proved 
explosive
86, and would herald the end of Wiley’s long government career.  The dispute began on 
February 27 when newspapers around the country reported a story that, despite Dunlap’s 
protestations, Wiley and Doolittle had united to abate cases against cream-of-tartar baking 
powders in which lead had been discovered.  The press charged that Wiley, long opposed to 
alum baking powders, had based his decision out of a desire to protect their competitors.
87  To 
add insult to injury, several confidential Board memoranda illustrating the internal fighting 
among the Board members, had been published as well, having undoubtedly been leaked to the 
press by Dunlap or someone in his office.
88 
   It was now clear that Wiley would resign under circumstances patently unfavorable to the 
Republican Party.  On March 1, Wiley met with Secretary Wilson and made a series of demands, 
most prominent of which called for Dunlap’s dismissal.  Wiley made clear that either his 
demands be met or he would resign.  Wiley’s resignation would undoubtedly plunge Republicans 
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into an intractable political dilemma.   
  On March 15 Wiley went to Secretary Wilson’s office to submit his resignation.  The two 
men talked for an hour.  Wilson indeed recognized the political challenge confronting the 
administration but was unwilling to placate Wiley any further.  In his view, Wiley’s position to a 
large extent was self-afflicted.  He did not trust Wiley and thought him to be a grandstander and 
a show-boater.  He had appeased him once, but was not prepared to do so again.  He informed 
Wiley that he regretted his decision to resign but would not remove any more of his political 
foes.
89   
  Wilson announced Wiley’s resignation during a cabinet meeting shortly thereafter.  
President Taft, well aware of the conundrum he now had on his hands, immediately ordered the 
search for a replacement.  In a statement to reporters, Taft expressed regret at Wiley’s departure, 
lamenting, “I am very sorry to lose Dr. Wiley, who has done a great work in initiating and 
enforcing the operation of the pure food law, and I would be very glad if he could continue in the 
service of the government.”
90  Unfortunately for Taft, Wiley had no such intention.  Not only 
would he not remain in government service, he would campaign against the Republican 
incumbent in the upcoming presidential election.   
PART IV: RAMIFICATIONS FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1912 
  Wiley’s resignation would have profound ramifications for the presidential election of 
1912.  Given his national stature and the incredibly high esteem in which the public held him, 
Wiley’s departure would prove fatal for Republicans during an election year.   
  The Chief Chemist hoped that even in his absence, the uncommitted, unworthy officials 
who he had previously worked with, and who in his opinion had compromised the administration 
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and enforcement of the pure food and drugs law, would be dismissed.
91  Taft, however, refused 
to act.  A zealous crusader-warrior, Wiley now felt that he could no longer sit idly and quietly 
by.  In his view, President Roosevelt had subverted his efforts to enforce the Pure Food and 
Drugs Act in the manner intended by Congress, and had readily sacrificed consumer safety on 
the altar of big business.
92  William Howard Taft inherited a problematic, albeit difficult 
situation, yet failed to rectify it.  A partisan Republican his entire life, Wiley remained steadfast 
to the GOP out of conviction that the party would not “suffer itself…to become the refuge and 
protector of the gambler, the dollar lover, the cheat and the adulterator,” but now, after his 
exhaustive time in government, he thought the party “so completely subjugated by the Dollar, so 
permeated by the canker of Big Business as its only god, that only…defeat can ever restore its 
health.”
93   
  And work for the GOP’s defeat Wiley did.  A lifelong Republican, he leveraged his 
national fame as pure-food reformer to campaign for Democratic candidates across the country.  
He authored an article for The Democratic Text-Book.  He served as vice-president of the 
Woodrow Wilson National Progressive Republic League and also as the chair of the Bureau of 
Health Conservation of the Women’s National Woodrow Wilson and Marshall Organization.  
Wiley even took to the stump to persuade other lifelong Republicans like himself to support 
Democratic candidates.   
  Recognizing the political liability the pure food and drugs issue was becoming for him, 
Taft tried in vain to architect an attempt to dissuade Wiley from attacking him and the 
Republican Party over the Pure Food and Drugs Act.  The attempt was unsuccessful and Wiley 
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was relentless in his criticism, later declaring that he was convinced that “when [Woodrow] 
Wilson and Marshall have taken office, the food laws of the country will be administered for the 
public good as intended, both in spirit and in the letter of the law.”
94  Democrats were grateful to 
have such a potent weapon in their arsenal, with prominent Democrats eagerly soliciting the 
reformer’s help while Woodrow Wilson himself personally discussed the pure food issue on 
several occasions.
95   
  In the end the Wiley’s campaign against the GOP proved successful.  He had effectively 
leveraged his stature and nationally recognized expertise in the area to turn the pure food and 
drugs issue decisively against the Republicans.  Doing so ultimately contributed to Wilson’s 
ascension to the presidency in the election and to Taft’s defeat in the election of 1912.     
Concluding Thoughts     
In the end, it is difficult not to see both Wiley and Wilson in different lights than the ones 
history has put them in.  Posterity has celebrated Wiley as a hero, a champion of public affairs, 
and a principled consumer protection advocate above all else, who refused to compromise when 
the nation’s health was at stake.  Wilson, on the other hand, has been condemned, reviled, and 
portrayed as the villain to Wiley’s protagonist.  One expert portrays Wilson as Wiley’s 
“nemesis” who “showed a total incapacity to understand Wiley’s position or take a stand on 
matters of public health.”
96  The authors of 100,000,000 Guinea Pigs, were even more critical, 
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writing “…this permission to poison, casually granted by the technically ignorant and socially 
indifferent Secretary of Agriculture stands to this day unchanged.”
97   
While there is no doubt that Wiley was indeed an effective consumer protection advocate 
with a warrior’s zeal and determination, the fact remains that he engaged in some highly 
questionable tactics against both his superiors and colleagues to achieve his ends.  As one expert 
points out, “he was a great man, but also self-righteous, who had a hard time seeing anyone 
else’s point of view but his own, and was willing to do almost anything to get what he wanted.”
98    
Wilson, on the other hand, supported Wiley as much as he could, and despite harboring 
deep-seated doubts about Wiley’s intentions and personal integrity after being the target of his 
repeated attacks, continued to encourage and support him, even going so far as to appease Wiley 
on certain issues to retain the Chief Chemist’s services.  While it is easy to praise Wiley at 
Wilson’s expense, it is clear that Wilson allowed Wiley to succeed as far as he and the prevailing 
circumstances would allow.  More importantly, Wilson’s other accomplishments should not be 
obscured by his contentious relationship to Wiley.  Wilson was set new records through his 
sixteen years as Secretary, and laid the groundwork for the modern day Department of 
Agriculture.  These are not insignificant achievements 
Ultimately, as this paper has sought to demonstrate, both these men and the others within 
the Bureau were political actors operating in highly charged political environments, making 
political decisions.  Looking at Wilson, Wiley, and the Bureau of Chemistry’s attempts to 
administer and enforce the Pure Food and Drugs law through a political prism allows one to 
garner an entirely new perspective on those years following passage of the historic law and leads 
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to the inescapable conclusion that politics will always have an inevitable effect on the work of 
those dedicating their lives to public service and to a cause greater than themselves.  Wilson, 
Wiley, and the others within the Bureau of Chemistry were no exception.   
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